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Abstract 
Since its development for the Apollo project in 1963, Design Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been 
increasingly employed, especially in the automotive industry, as a means for understanding and managing 
risk. When this analysis is applied to an existing process or manufacturing line, the manufacturing processes 
are established and existing process data can be employed in the determination of severity, occurrence and 
detection of process failures. When a new manufacturing line is being developed or scaled up from a pilot 
process, there is less certainty and limited analogous process data. This paper describes the use of 
Manufacturing System Design Decomposition (MSDD) in the design of manufacturing processes in 
conjunction with definition of the Process FMEA model. 
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1 Introduction 
A new dual-stage overmolding process for the 
packaging of automotive electronic crash sensors is 
being developed in a pilot process at TRW 
Automotive LLC. This activity has coincided with  
an initial investigation into the application of 
Axiomatic Design in the definition of manufacturing 
Functional Requirements for the development of 
manufacturing processes and simulation models as a 
part of the DEMS program at Lawrence 
Technological University. 
As with any new endeavor, or change in product or 
practice, risks of failure represent a potential 
outcome of unforeseen events. That is, one or more 
of the functional requirements of the product or 
process that is required in order to satisfy customer 
wants is not adequately sustained by the product or 
process design parameters. In 1963, NASA 
developed Design Failure Mode Effect Analysis 
(DFMEA) for the Apollo space program in order to 
reduce the inherent risks in a new space exploration 
system. By 1977, Ford Motor Company had began 
applying FMEA to automotive systems.    
Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA) in Germany 
published their first FMEA method specification in 
1986 [1]. With the most recent Volume 4 revision of 
the VDA guideline, there is a shift from a component 
by component failure mode analysis to a model based 
on the failure to satisfy system functions. This could 
be the function of an automotive system or as 
demonstrated in the case illustrated here, it could be 
the function of a manufacturing system. 
 
  










Figure 1: Prototypical Part 
 
For this discussion, a simple three-step 
manufacturing process for the manufacture of the 
Dolog Mk1 in Figure 1 is used as the example. In this 
hypothetical process, the Dolog’s plastic body is 
molded, followed by assembly of a threaded fastener 
and finally a functional test is performed on the 
device. One of the process functional requirements 
might be to inject plastic into a mold cavity in order 
to form the body of the Dolog. Since a certain 
volume of plastic is required in order to form that 
shape in the mold, it is possible to envision that too 
little plastic might be injected due to variability in the 
process, or the intrusion of unwanted conditions. This 
failure mode of plastic injection which is shown in 
Figure 2, insufficient plastic, has some impact on 
Dolog performance and might occur with some 
frequency through-out the course of a production run. 
This is defined as the occurrence of the actual or 
probable failure and a score ranging from one to ten 
is assigned based upon predetermined industrial 
criteria standards.  
If insufficient plastic represents a failure mode of the 
process, then excess plastic might also be included as 
a failure mode. With too little plastic, this process 
failure might affect the safety of the customer while 
too much plastic might only represent an 
inconvenience and loss of profit to the producer. 
Accordingly, different types of process failures might 
be judged to have different levels of “Severity”, that 
is potential effect on the customer. As with 
Occurrence, Severity is assigned a score of ranging 
from one to ten from the industrial standards 
published by one of the associations such as the 
Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) or VDA 
[1,2] A series of tables have been defined and 
published as a reference and benchmark for 
Occurrence, Severity and Detection by the 
Automotive Industry Action Group. The combination 
of Severity and Occurrence can be countered by 
Detection. The overall risk score is calculated by 
multiplying the Severity, Occurrence and Detection 
scores and this product is known as the Risk Priority 
Number (RPN). From our example, if pressure 
transducers are fitted to each cavity in the mold, the 
failure mode of insufficient plastic can be detected 
from the reduced cavity pressure. So, while Severity 
and Occurrence might have high scores, it would be 
countered by a low number for Detection resulting in 
a reduced RPN score.  
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) and 
Axiomatic Design (AD) have a common basis in that 
they both focus upon Functions and Functional 
Requirements. AD decomposes Functional 
Requirements into Design Parameters and thence into 
process variables. In comparison, the FMEA defines 
the system element and then the function. These 
functions are correspondingly associated with failure 
modes and a quantified RPN risk assessment for each 
failure mode. The following example shown in 
Figure 2 provides the basic structure of the FMEA. In 
this example, a function, identified as “Functional 
Requirement FR 1.2.1.5 Inject plastic into mold 
cavity” is identified with a potential failure mode of 
“Insufficient volume injected”. In order to counter 
this failure mode, a Recommended Action - Design 
Parameter is specified to incorporate mold cavity 
pressure sensing to ensure that the mold cavity is 
properly filled. This design criteria is then fed back 
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Figure 2: Example FMEA Form 
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design can be optimized and risk managed by 
employing Axiomatic Design to define the 
Functional Requirements and Design Parameters, and 
then employing Failure Mode Effects Analysis on 
that product or process design.  
Pappalarado and Naddeo [4] extensively describe this 
relationship in failure mode analysis. They restrict 
their discussion to the non-probabilistic information 
models. Their basic model in axiomatic terms is that 
Potential Cause of Failure (DP) relates to the 
Functional Requirement through the relationship 
matrix. The general practice in the development of a 
FMEA is to identify a selection of potential failure 
modes, from experience, historical data, intuition, 
etc. and then map these to the physical design 
domain. Alternatively, they describe the 
identification of functional domain as a failure 
mechanism domain and the physical domain as the 
source of stress in relation to that domain. 
2 The Model 
As previously stated, the example consists of three 
process steps to manufacture the module: mold the 
body, assemble the screw, and perform a functional 
test. The following flowchart Figure 3 provides a 
simple conventional sequential process view. 
 
 
Figure 3: Process Flow Chart 
 
Alternatively, this same three-process manufacturing 
system could be considered from the perspective of 
Manufacturing Systems Design Decomposition as 





David Cochran and others proposed specific 
application of functional decomposition and related 
design parameters from Axiomatic Design theory to 
manufacturing system design which they called 
“Manufacturing System Design Decomposition”, 
(MSDD). Within the MSDD methodology, the main 
focus is on the decomposition of functional 
requirements and the association of design 
parameters. Other aspects of Axiomatic Design such 
as the Information Axiom are not explicitly 
employed. [3].  
The top level Functional Requirement (FR0) is to 
“Manufacture molded module”. For the first level of 
decomposition, this can be decomposed as shown in 
Figure 5 into FR1: Mold-sub-assembly, FR2: 
Assemble threaded fastener, and FR3: Test part 
function.  
The Axiomatic Design Parameters (DP) correlates to 
system architecture FMEA elements as shown in 
Figure 5. FR2: Assemble threaded fastener is 
expanded through decomposition. As shown, the 
manufacturing system can be broken down into finite 
entities (e.g. Design Parameters) associated with the 
FR’s, such that the entities work together to deliver 
the function of the system. In FMEA terminology, a 
system element is a component, part, process or 
entity of the FMEA that is being created. It is shown 
on the structure editor as a box. All of the system 
elements together show the physical component, part, 
or entity logical breakdown of the FMEA. Creating 
the interrelationships between the system elements is 
the first step in creating a FMEA and this is enabled 
using the Axiomatic Design model. This supports the 
system architecture model from the VDA. 
DP2 describes the assembly workstation for 
assembling screws into the molded part. The MSDD 
model demonstrates decomposition to the second 
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Figure 4: Decomposition and FMEA 




For example the function FR2.3 Feed screw to driver 
tip could be decomposed further into FR2.3.1 
Maintain quantity of screws, FR2.3.2 Orient screws, 
FR2.3.3 Transport screw and FR2.3.4 Gate screw to 
driver tip. This decomposition is shown in Figure 6 
to illustrate the point that decomposition can continue 
to increasingly fine levels of resolution. How far 
should this decomposition proceed? Failure modes 
are derived from lessons learned, engineering 
experience, manufacturing experience, analogous 
designs or processes, logic, fault analysis, failure 
data, etc. If the stated objective of the FMEA process 
is to analyze and manage risk, then the 
decomposition and identification of failure modes 
should proceed to a level where prior or analogous 
process failure mode knowledge exists. 
Axiomatic Functional Requirements (FR) correlate to 
FMEA Functions as shown in Figure 7 (functions 
shown in green, failures shown in red). A function is 
the action and / or an activity assigned to or required 
of the system element.  These functions are attached 
or anchored to the system element. Each function has 
one or more failure modes attached or anchored to 
the function. A failure mode describes how the 
function operates improperly. Figure 7 illustrates the 
failure modes for each function. 
The next step is to create Function Nets and Failure 
Nets. Function nets form trees of higher level 
functions on the left and the lower level functions on 
the right that are required to perform the higher level 
functions.  The function nets are built one function at 
a time. Failure nets are mapped according to the 
function net mapping. What this means is that 
function net relationships dictate failure net 
relationships. Failures can only be populated that are 
part of the function net tree.   
The next step is to populate preventative actions, 
occurrence ratings, detection actions, and detection 
ratings which are anchored to the failures. Severity 
ratings are also created and anchored to the top level 
failure modes in Figure 8. As the failure rate drops 
(in PPM), so does the severity of the rating. For 
higher product knowledge and greater maturity of 
development, a lower severity rating is acceptable.  
The scale is from ‘low-1’ to ‘high-10’. Detection 
ratings are identified by the letter “D”. As the 
diagnostic capability increases, the severity of the 
rating goes down. Scale is from ‘low-1’ to ‘high-10’. 
 
 
Figure 5: Decomposition and FMEA 
  
 




Figure 6: Decomposition and FMEA for FR2.3 
 
 
With table 1, the RPN numbers are apparent as a 
means to assess risk for the molding process along 
with preventative actions. 
The next step is to create a FMEA Form. A form is 
the output that will be reviewed internally at TRW 
and externally with the customer. A form is created 
automatically by the IQFMEA software in the 
industry standard VDA 96 format. The form is 
created from the failure net trees. The failure modes 
on the form are the focal point failure elements from 
the failure net. The effects on the form are the top 
level vehicle level failure effects. The severity on the 
form is the severity from the top level vehicle level 
failure effect. The causes are the direct causes 
connected in the failure net. The preventative action, 
detection actions, occurrence ratings, and detection 
ratings are linked to the direct failure net causes. The 






Figure 7: Failure Modes and Countermeasures 
Preventive 
Actions 
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The PFMEA provides a static picture of risk, fixed at 
the point of its completion. Beyond this static 
analysis, process failure modes can be modeled 
through the “Breakdowns” tab, in process simulation 
models so that the Process Failure Mode Effect 
Analysis (PFMEA) can be simulated with 
probabilistic Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) affecting cell 
functionality and capacity. Each cycle in the 
Multicycle machine is defined as a Functional 
Requirement and the PFMEA identifies failure 
modes for each function, establishing a clear linkage. 
The convention developed is to employ the FR 
number, i.e. “FR1.2.1.1” and a small letter suffix plus 
text in the description so that the breakdown is linked 
to a specific Functional Requirement. The letter 
suffix is necessary since each function may have 
more than one failure mode. Unfortunately, Witness 
does not support the linkage of specific failure modes 
to specific cycles in the Multicycle Machine object. 
Note that in this example, not all failure modes are 
modeled since the objective is to demonstrate 
methodology which links the Axiomatic model, the 
simulation model and the Process Failure Mode 
Effect Analysis (PFMEA). 
 
3 Dynamic Modeling of Risk 
The PFMEA and its Risk Priority Number scoring 
system provides a static picture of risk, fixed at the 
point of its completion. The AIAG and VDA 
guidelines for preparing a PFMEA provide a scoring 
table for characterizing Occurrence with a ranking 
score. With the addition of a Frequency column to 
this table, as shown in Table 1, information 
developed in preparation of the PFMEA based on the 
Occurrence ranking can also be employed in process 
simulation modeling. In this way, the process 
simulation model will more accurately reflect the 
modeled manufacturing process as well as relating 
directly to the PFMEA by employing Occurrence in 
defining process breakdowns. In this proposal, the 
rate is defined through a probability density function 
such as the uniform distribution. This would have the 
form f(x) = Uniform(2000,10000) for the example 
where the lower bound is set at 1 in 2,000 units and 
the upper bound set at 1 in 10,000 with a uniform 
probability of selection. This would be the 
distribution for a “Moderate” level of risk and a 
ranking of “5”. 
 
Table 1: Occurrence and Frequency Ranking 
 
 
Process failure modes can be modeled through the 
“Breakdowns” tab, in Witness simulation software as 
shown in Figure 8, for process simulation models so 
that the Process Failure Mode Effect Analysis 
(PFMEA) can be simulated with probabilistic Mean 
Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time To 
Repair (MTTR) affecting cell functionality and 
capacity [5]. Each cycle in the Multicycle machine is 
defined as a Functional Requirement and the PFMEA 
identifies failure modes for each function, 
establishing a clear linkage. The convention 
developed is to employ the FR number, i.e. 
“FR1.2.1.1” and a small letter suffix plus text in the 
description so that the breakdown is linked to a 
specific Functional Requirement.  
The letter suffix is necessary since each function may 
have more than one failure mode.  Unfortunately, 
Witness does not support the linkage of specific 
failure modes to specific cycles in the Multicycle 
Machine object. Note that in this example, not all 
failure modes are modeled since the objective is to 
demonstrate methodology which links the Axiomatic 
model, the simulation model and the Process Failure 
Mode Effect Analysis (PFMEA). 
 




Risk and Manufacturing System Performance 
Since the early efforts in risk assessment and 
management in the space program, FMEA has been a 
static tool, frozen at the time of the analysis. With the 
employment of probabilistic simulation modeling 
where frequency of failure occurrence is continually 
selected from a probability distribution function, a 
more dynamic approach to FMEA is possible. The 
effect of these process breakdowns or failures and 
their impact on process through-put and cost can be 
assessed in a manner that more accurately reflects the 
actual manufacturing system. In place of the 
limitations of the RPN score and ad hoc RPN score 
thresholds in assessing the impact on manufacturing 
operations, yield and cost can be characterized. If for 
example, the Occurrence rank is determined to have 
been improved through manufacturing process 
improvements from a “6” to a “5”, the benefit of the 




Manufacturing Systems Design Decomposition, 
function based Process Failure Mode Effect Analysis 
and process simulation each, in their own right, can 
be employed in the improvement of manufacturing 
operations. The greatest benefit can be achieved 
through the integration of these three important tools 
so that the rational process design drives the structure 
of the functionally modeled PFMEA as well as the 
structure of the simulation model which includes 
dynamic simulation of the process failure modes. 
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Figure 8: Process Simulation of Failure Occurrence 
